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RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL IN
BANKRUPTCY DISCHARGE PROCEEDINGS
A debtor who files a petition for bankruptcy seeks to have his debts
adjudicated discharged.' Bankruptcy courts, in determining whether a
debt is dischargeable,2 occasionally consider whether res judicata or collat-
eral estoppel effect should be given to a prior state court judgment on the
debt.' Tfle doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel are fundamen-
tal precepts of common law.4 The doctrines require that a right, question,
or fact put in issue and specifically determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction cannot be relitigated by the same parties in a subsequent suit.5
Res judicata makes a valid, final judgment on the merits conclusive as
to all matters that should or could have been litigated in reference to the
"Discharge" is the release of a bankrupt debtor from all his debts except puch debts
which are excepted by the Bankruptcy Act. 11 U.S.C. § 1(15) (1976).
2 In a bankruptcy proceeding, the debtor first is granted a general discharge for all his
debts. After the general discharge, a creditor can have a particular debt, which falls under
one of the the exceptions to discharge, declared nondipchargeable. D. EPSTmN & J. LANDERS,
DEBTOR AND CREDrroRs CASES AND MATERLS 386-87 (1978) [hereinafter cited as EPSTEIN].
Both the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 ("Bankruptcy Act"), 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1086 (1976), and the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 ("Reform Act"), 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-151326 (1979), allow
exceptions to discharge. The Bankruptcy Act provides both a federal remedy for creditors and
a federal relief for debtors. EPSTEIN, supra at 380. The Bankruptcy Act is designed to relieve
the honest debtor from his debts and to give him a fresh start in the business world. Local
Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 245 (1934). The Reform Act is designed to modernize the
bankruptcy laws to reflect the changes in modem society. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 3, 4, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5963, 5965.
The specific types of debts excepted from the general discharge are listed in § 17a of the
Bankruptcy Act and in § 523a of the Reform Act. 11 U.S.C. § 35a (1976); 11 U.S.C.A. § 523a
(1979). Examples of these exceptions are debts for taxes, debts induced by fraud, and debts
for willful and malicious injury. 11 U.S.C. § 35a(1), (2), (4) & (8) (1976); 11 U.S.C.A. §
523a(1), (2), (4) & (6) (1979).
Occasionally a creditor, who files a complaint in the bankruptcy court to determine
dischargeability of a debt, has previously obtained judgment on the debt against the bank-
rupt in a state court. The bankruptcy court must decide to what extent the prior decison
binds the bankruptcy court by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Lasarow,
Debts Not Affected by Discharge, in 232 CoRPoRATE LAW AND PRACTICE 198 (PLI 1977).
The problem of whether res judicata or collateral estoppel effect should be given to a prior
judgment also arises when the debt has been reduced to judgment by a federal court. See
Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726, 732-33 (1946) (prior judgment by federal court with diver-
sity jurisdiction); In re Ross, 602 F.2d 604, 607 (3d Cir. 1979) (prior judgment by federal court
applying federal securities laws). See text accompanying notes 78-90 infra.
See Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979).
See id. The theory behind the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel is that
an issue should be judicially determined only once between the same parties and their privies.
Id. By barring a party from contesting matters which he had a full and fair opportunity to
litigate, the other party is protected from the expense and vexation attending multiple law-
suits. Also, res judicata and collateral estoppel promotes conservation of judicial resources
and an increased reliance on judicial action since the possibility of inconsistent decisions is
minimized. Id. at 153-54.
282 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXVII
same cause of action.' Application of res judicata necessitates identifying
the causes of action in two different suits involving the same parties. If the
causes of action are -the same, the judgment in the first suit constitutes an
absolute bar to the second suit.7
Although the doctrine of res judicata is concerned with "causes of ac-
tion" in different suits between the same parties, the doctrine of collateral
estoppel is concerned with "issues" raised in different suits between the
same parties.' If an issue is litigated in the first suit, collateral estoppel
bars relitigation of that issue in a second suit.' The decision of the first
court on the common issue is binding and conclusive on the second court."
In order for the doctrine of collateral estoppel to apply, four require-
ments must be met. First, the issue presented in the second action must
be identical to that involved in the prior action." The first court, in deter-
mining factual issues, must have used standards identical to those stan-
dards which would be used by the second court in determining the same
issue." Second, the issue must actually have been litigated and adjudi-
cated in the prior action. 3 In order for there to be an actual litigation, there
6 See id.; Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352 (1876). Res judicata does not
operate as a bar in a suit on a different cause of action. See 1B MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcTIcE
0.401 (2d ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as 1B MooRE's].
See 1B MooRE's, supra note 6, 0.410[1].
In a bankruptcy discharge proceeding, only the creditor to whom a particular debt is
owed by the bankrupt has standing to claim that the particular debt should be excepted from
the general discharge. 11 U.S.C. § 35c(2) (1976); 11 U.S.C.A. § 523c (1979). See also note 2
supra.
I See Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979). Collateral estoppel bars
relitigation of an issue even though the second suit is so different from the first that the second
suit is not barred by res judicata. See 1B MooRE's, supra note 6, 0.441[2].
11 See Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979); 1B MooRE's, supra note 6,
0.441[2]. To illustrate the difference between res judicata and collateral estoppel, consider
the following hypothetical. A sues B for injuries incurred in an automobile accident and
alleges B is liable because of negligence. A judgment is rendered on the merits in favor of A.
The judgment is a final judicial settlement of A's claim against B concerning the accident.
Even though A may have been able to recover more money through punitive damages based
on a theory that B willfully and maliciously caused the accident, A is barred by res judicata
from doing so in a subsequent suit because the cause of action in the second suit would be
the same as the first. See id. 0.405.
Suppose, however, A subsequently sues B on a different cause of action, such as placing
a judgment lien on B's property to enforce the judgment above. The first suit would not have
res judicata effect on this second suit. Nevertheless, collateral estoppel would bar the relitiga-
tion of B's liability to A regarding the accident. The second court must accept the issue of
B's liability as conclusive. See id.
" See In re Ross, 602 F.2d 604, 608 (3d Cir. 1979); In re Merrill, 594 F.2d 1064, 1067 (5th
Cir. 1979); 1B MooRE's, supra note 6, 0.4431l].
22 See Brown v. Felsen, 99 S. Ct. 2205 (1979). The Supreme Court noted in Brown that
a prior state court decision may have collateral estoppel effect if the state court determined
factual issues using standards identical to those of § 17 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. §
35 (1976). Id. at 2213 n.10.
11 See In re Ross, 602 F.2d 604, 608 (3d Cir. 1979); In re Merrill, 594 F.2d 1064, 1067 (5th
Cir. 1979); 1B MooRE's, supra note 6, 0.44311].
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must be a trial on the merits. Collateral estoppel effect will not be given
to default or consent judgments, or to stipulated judgments unless the
record is clear that the parties intended the decision to be binding in future
suits. 4 An issue also must have been fully adjudicated. Full adjudication
requires that the court make specific findings concerning the issue. 5 Third,
the issue must have been material and relevant to the disposition of the
first action. 6 If the first court decided a matter related to the facts at issue,
but the determination of the related matter was not material to the dispo-
sition of the first action, the determination of the related matter has no
collateral estoppel effect on any subsequent action." The fourth require-
ment for application of the collateral estoppel doctrine mandates that the
determination of the issue was essential and necessary to the prior judg-
ment."
11 See 1B MooRE's, supra note 6, 0.444[1]; In re McMillan, 579 F.2d 289, 393 (3d Cir.
1978) (prior state court default judgment not given collateral estoppel effect because issue
not actually litigated); In re Garland, 401 F. Supp. 608, 610 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (default
judgment has no collateral estoppel effect in later suits involving different matters); In re
Wong, 5 BANKR. CT. DEC. 222, 225 (D. Ore. 1979) (default judgment does not give rise to
rebuttable prima facie case of fraud); In re Conway, 3 BiAKR. CT. DEC. 365, 366 (N.D. Tex.
1977) (issues not litigated in default judgment); In re Garrard, 3 BANK. CT. DEC. 223, 225
(N.D. Ga. 1977) (debtor should not be compelled to defend and litigate merely to establish
precise ground of liability). But see In re Nadler, 424 F. Supp. 1106, 1108 (E.D. Mo. 1976)
(consent judgment equivalent to admission by defendant that facts existed on which decree
rests).
11 The situation where a creditor sues a debtor based on breach of contract and fraud
illustrates the requirement of actual adjudication for collateral estoppel. If in awarding judg-
ment for the creditor the court addresses only the breach issue and does not address the fraud
issue, there is collateral estoppel only with respect to the breach. The fraud issue was not
adjudicated. See Russell v. Place, 94 U.S. 606, 609-10 (1876); 1B MooRE's, supra note 6,
0.443[4].
" See 1B MooPE's, supra note 6, 0.443[1]; note 17 infra.
'7 Landon v. Clark, 221 F. 841 (2d Cir. 1915), illustrates the application of the material
and relevant requirement of collateral estoppel. In the first suit, Clark sued Landon's prede-
cessor in title for trespassing on Wickham Pond, claiming he owned the entire pond. Id. at
842. Landon's predecessor admitted trespassing but claimed ownership of a substantial por-
tion of the pond, including the areas upon which he had entered. The court ruled in favor of
Landon's predecessor stating that the predecessor was the owner of that portion of the pond
to which he claimed title. Id. at 846. The first court expressly found that several tracts
belonged to Landon's predecessor and that one of these tracts, consisting of 8.7 acres, was
the tract on which the alleged trespass had been committed. Id.
Subsequently, Landon sued Clark to quiet title to tracts of Wickham Pond which Lan-
don's predecessor claimed and which had been decreed to belong to Landon's predecessor by
the prior suit. Clark did not question Landon's ownership of the 8.7 acre tract but contended
that the prior suit had no collateral estoppel effect as to the other tracts. The court agreed
with Clark reasoning that title to the other tracts was not material to the prior suit since the
prior judgment had not depended upon findings of title, except as to the 8.7 acre tract. Id. at
847.
Is See In re Ross, 602 F.2d 604, 608 (3d Cir. 1979); In re Merrill, 594 F.2d 1064, 1067 (5th
Cir. 1979); 1B MooPE's, supra note 6, 0.443[1]. The collateral estoppel requirement that
the determination of the issue must have been essential and necessary presents a problem
when a plaintiff bases his claim in the first suit on independently adequate grounds. Id.
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A bankruptcy judge occasionally considers the doctrines of res judicata
and collateral estoppel" when, prior to the debtor's petition for bank-
ruptcy, a state court has reduced to judgment specific contractual debts
of the debtor. The creditor usually based his state court claim to recover
the debt on contract theory and not on fraud. 0 Even if the creditor also
alleged fraud, the state court usually awarded judgment based on contract
theory alone and did not make any findings on the fraud claim.2 Often
judgment was awarded by default or stipulation which also results in re-
duction of the debt to judgment without a specific finding of fraud." Since
the debt is reduced to judgment before the debtor files for bankruptcy, the
bankruptcy court faces a res judicata problem when a creditor claims that
0.443[5]. The situation where the creditor sues to recover a debt and bases his claim on
breach of contract and fraud illustrates the essential and necessary requirement. If the first
court renders a general verdict in favor of the creditor but is silent as to whether the creditor
prevailed on the contract issue or the fraud issue, there is no collateral estoppel effect given
to either the contract issue or the fraud issue. On the other hand, if the court makes specific
findings that there was fraud and a breach of contract, there is collateral estoppel effect given
to both even though the court ruled in favor of the creditor alternatively on the two grounds.
See id.; United States v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 265 U.S. 472, 486 (1924) (when trial court
bases decision on two grounds, either of which supports judgment, and appellate court adopts
both grounds, there is collateral estoppel on both grounds); Irving Nat. Bank v. Law, 10 F.2d
721, 724 (2d Cir. 1926) (if court decides case on two independent grounds, each has collateral
estoppel effect); RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 68, comment n (1942) (judgment based on
alternative grounds has collateral estoppel effect on both grounds). But see Halpern v.
Schwartz, 426 F.2d 102, 105 (2d Cir. 1970) (no collateral estoppel effect to either alternative
ground since losing party might not appeal because-of likelihood at least one ground would
be upheld); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, Explanatory Notes § 68, comments i, o
(Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977) (adopting position of Halpern v. Schwartz unless appellate court
upholds both grounds as sufficient).
The problem presented by the essential and necessary requirement becomes more acute
if the first court specifically determines that there was a breach of contract but not fraud.
Although collateral estoppel effect will be given to the contract issue, the majority rule does
not give collateral estoppel effect to the fraud issue. See 1B MooRE's, supra note 6,
0.44315]. The rational behind the majority rule is that the creditor, as the winning litigant,
cannot appeal the first court's decision. See id. But cf. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Gillan,
70 F. Supp. 640, 650 (D. Neb. 1945) (suggesting that a rule which denies collateral estoppel
effect to issues decided against winning litigant should be limited to situations in which losing
litigant ddes not appeal).
1, See note 3 supra.
20 See In re Nicholas, 510 F.2d 160, 162 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1012 (1975).
In Nicholas, the creditor instituted an action in state court to recover a debt and only alleged
breach of contract. After creditor was awarded judgment, the debtor filed for bankruptcy. The
circuit court held the debt was dischargeable. Id. at 163. The court reasoned that since the
creditor could have raised a fraud claim in the state court, the doctrine of res judicata barred
the bankruptcy court from deciding whether the debt was induced by fraud. Thus, the debt
was excepted from discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 35a(2) (1976). 510 F.2d at 163-64. But see
text accompanying notes 26-44 infra.
2" The state court will not make any findings on the fraud claim since the court has
already found there was a breach of contract and the debtor owes the creditor money. See,
e.g., In re Pigge, 539 F.2d 369, 372 (4th Cir. 1976) (creditor sued on both breach and fraud,
but state court only made findings on breach).
2 See text accompanying notes 28-30 infra.
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the same debt is not dischargeable under section 523a(2)2 of the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 197824 (Reform Act) because of fraud perpetrated by
the debtor on the creditor.? The bankrupt debtor will claim that there was
no finding of fraud in the prior state court decision. Therefore, res judicata
arguably would bar litigation of the fraud issue, even though the applica-
tion of section 523a(2) was not an issue in the state court proceedings.
The fraud claim sometimes is fully litigated in the prior state court
proceedings, and the state court makes specific findings of fraud by the
debtor. In this situation, the creditor claims that the bankruptcy court is
barred from relitigating the fraud issue. By the doctrine of collateral estop-
pel, the bankruptcy court arguably must accept the state court findings
of fraud and, therefore, must declare the debt nondischargeable.
In Brown v. Felsen,21 the Supreme Court determined whether a state
court proceeding which reduced a debt to judgment prior to bankruptcy
would have res judicata effect on a bankruptcy court proceeding, when the
bankruptcy court subsequently considers the dischargeability of the same
debt under section 17a(2) of the Bankruptcy Act." Brown, the plaintiff,
m 11 U.S.C.A. § 523a(2) (1979). Section 523a lists types of debts excepted from the
general discharge given to a bankrupt. See note 2 supra & note 25 infra.
24 11 U.S.C.A. § 101-151326 (1979).
25 Under § 17a(2) of the Bankruptcy Act, there must be actual fraud perpetrated by the
debtor on the creditor. Fraud implied by law, which may exist without imputation of bad
faith or immorality, is insufficient. 1A COLLmR ON BANKRUprcy 17.16[3] (14th ed. 1978)
[hereinafter cited as 1A COLLIER 1978]. Early interpretations of § 17a(2) required that in
order for there to be actual fraud under § 17a(2), the creditor must show that the debtor
knowingly made false representations with the intent to deceive the creditor. See id. Pres-
ently, the debtor need nQt have actual knowledge that the representations were false, but he
only needs have had a reckless disregard for the truth. See Carini v. Matera, 592 F.2d 378,
380 (7th Cir. 1979); In re Houtman, 568 F.2d 651, 656 (9th Cir. 1978); In re Butler, 425 F.2d
47, 50 (3d Cir. 1970); In re Blessings, 442 F. Supp. 68, 70 (S.D. Ind. 1977); In re Smith, 424
F. Supp. 858, 861 (M.D. La. 1976); In re Bowler, 208 F. Supp. 879, 880 (W.D. Va. 1962). In
addition, the creditor reasonably must have relied on these representations and sustained the
alleged damage as the proximate result of the representations. See In re McMillan, 579 F.2d
289, 292 n.5 (3d Cir. 1978); In re Houtman, 568 F.2d at 655; In re Burton, 4 BANKR. CT. DEC.
569, 570 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
Section 523a(2) of the Reform Act is the replacement provisions for § 17a(2) and only
slightly modifies § 17a(2). See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRuprcy 523.07 (15th ed. 1979) [hereinafter
cited as BANKRuPTcy 1979]. "Actual fraud" has been added as a ground for exception from
discharge. The creditor's reliance on the false representations also must have been reasonable.
These modifications codify case law construing § 17a(2) of the Bankruptcy Act. See, e.g., In
re McMillan, 579 F.2d at 292 n.5; In re Houtman, 568 F.2d at 655; In re Burton, 4 BANKR.
CT. DEC. at 570. Third, Congress deleted as unnecessary the phrase "in any manner what-
soever" that appears in § 17a(2) after "made or published." S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 78, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5787, 5864; H.R. REP. No. 595,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 364, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5963, 6320;
accord, BANKRuprcy 1979, supra, 523.07. Therefore, although the discussion which follows
in the text will be based on cases and writings on § 17a(2) of the Bankruptcy Act, the
discussion should apply equally to § 523a(2) of the Reform Act.
26 99 S. Ct. 2205 (1979).
2 Id. at 2207. In addition to claiming that the debt could not be discharged by § 17a(2)
of the Bankruptcy Act, the creditor in Brown claimed that the debt could not be discharged
19801
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had guaranteed certain loans made by Felsen, the defendant. Before the
defendant filed for bankruptcy, the creditor-bank brought a collection suit
against the defendantzdebtor and against the plaintiff, as the guarantor of
the loan. The plaintiff-guarantor filed a cross-claim against the defendant
alleging that the defendant induced the plaintiff to sign the guaranty
through misrepresentation and nondisclosure of material facts.2 The
collection suit was settled by stipulation which granted joint and several
recovery to the creditor-bank against both the plaintiff-guarantor and the
defendant-debtor. The stipulation also provided that the plaintiff should
prevail against the defendant on the cross-claim. Neither the stipulation
nor the resulting judgment, however, indicated the cause of action on
which defendant's liability to the plaintiff was based. 29 Subsequently, the
defendant filed for bankruptcy. The plaintiff sought to establish that de-
fendant's debt was not dischargeable because of defendant's fraud in the
inducement of the guarantee. The defendant claimed that there was no
finding of fraud in the prior state court proceedings and that res judicata
barred the bankruptcy court from litigating the issue. The bankruptcy
court agreed with the defendant and held the debt dischargeable.
3
1
The Supreme Court reversed the decisions below and rejected defen-
dant's contention that res judicata should apply.3' The Supreme Court
held that a bankruptcy court is not limited to the judgment and record of
a prior state court proceeding when considering the dischargeability of a
debt.32 Further, the Court reasoned that in an ordinary collection proceed-
ing, considerations material to discharge are irrelevant. The creditor in a
collection proceeding is suing on the instrument which created the debt,
and the cause of action is for non-payment of the debt.? In the subsequent
bankruptcy proceeding, the cause of action is based on the allegation that
the debt is not dischargeable. Thus, the dischargeability cause of action
does not arise until the debtor is declared bankrupt.
34
The Brown Court further reasoned that when a fraud issue is presented
in the state court proceeding, the state law concept of fraud is likely to
differ from that of section 17a(2) of the Bankruptcy Act5 If res judicata
by § 17a(4) of the Bankruptcy Act. Id. at 2208. The Court narrowed its discussion to fraud
which is an element of both §§ 17a(2) and 17a(4). Id. at 2208-09.
2 Id. at 2207.
" Id.
" Id. at 2207-09. Both the district court and the court of appeals affirmed the bankruptcy
court in Brown. Id. at 2209.
"1 Id. at 2213.
32 Id.
3 Id. at 2211.
31 See 1A CoLLIER 1978, supra note 25, 17.16[6] n.50; In re Conway, 3 BANKR. CT. DEC.
365, 365 n.4 (N.D. Tex. 1977) (causes of action are different); Fidelity & Casualty Co. v.
Golombosky, 133 Conn. 317, 50 A.2d 817, 820 (1946) (cause of action in discharge hearing is
extraneous to cause of action in prior suit on debt).
1 99 S. Ct. at 2211. The Bankruptcy Act requires actual fraud perpetrated by the debtor
on the creditor. Fraud implied by law is insufficient. See 1A CoLLIE 1978, supra note 25,
17.16[3].
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applies, a creditor would be forced to litigate every possible exception to
discharge in order to protect himself against the possibility that the debtor
may later be adjudicated bankrupt, thus creating unnecessary litigation."
Even if the state law fraud concept was identical to that required by
section 17a(2), the creditor may not consider claiming fraud to be advanta-
geous to him in a prebankruptcy collection suit. 7 So long as'a debtor is
solvent, a contract suit is preferable to an inherently more complex fraud
suit." A fraud action may result in increased legal fees for both parties and
may force the debtor into bankruptcy,39 thus decreasing the creditor's
chances of full payment. 0
As an additional reason for not allowing a prior state court proceeding
to have res judicata effect on a subsequent bankruptcy proceeding, the
Brown Court held that adoption of a policy of res judicata would undercut
congressional intent to commit section 17a(2) issues to the jurisdiction of
the bankruptcy court.4 The 1970 amendments to the Bankruptcy Act elim-
inated post-bankruptcy state court collection suits as a means of resolving
section 17a(2) dischargeability questions.42 The 1970 amendments gave the
bankruptcy court "exclusive" jurisdiction to determine the dischargea-
bility of certain debts, including those falling under section 17a(2).13 While
Congress did not specifically confront the problems created by prebank-
ruptcy state court judgments, the Supreme Court reasoned that to give res
judicata effect to prior state court proceedings, which forces section 17a
questions back into state courts, would be inconsistent with the philosophy
of the 1970 amendments.4'
i' 99 S. Ct. at 2211; accord, In re Lovitt, 4 BAKR. CT. DEC. 14, 17 (D.R.I. 1978) (no res
judicata since creditor would have to anticipate debtor's bankruptcy); cf. Pioneer Finance
and Thrift Co. v. Powell, 21 Utah 2d 201, 443 P.2d 389, 391 (1968) (when not necessary to
determine whether debt was induced by fraud, court should not determine fraud issue merely
because debtor may go bankrupt).
7 99 S. Ct. at 2212.
Id. at 2212 n.8.
23 In a fraud action the creditor may be awarded punitive damages, but the advantages
of these additional damages may be offset by the prospect of driving the debtor into bank-
kuptcy. Id.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 2211.
11 11 U.S.C. § 35c (1976). The 1970 amendments to the Bankruptcy Act vested the
bankruptcy courts with exclusive jurisdiction on questions of exceptions to discharge under
Bankruptcy Act § 17a(2), (4) & (8). 11 U.S.C. § 35a(2), (4), & (8) (1976). See, e.g., In re
McMillan, 579 F.2d 289, 291 (3d Cir. 1978); In re Houtman, 568 F.2d 651, 653 (9th Cir. 1978);
Countryman, The New Dischargeability Law, 45 AM. BAiNK. L.J. 1, 25-28 (1971) [hereinafter
cited, as Countryman]. Other courts have concurrent jurisdiction on discharge questions
falling under other paragraphs of Bankruptcy Act § 17. See, e.g., In re Houtman, 568 F.2d at
653; Countryman, supra at 29. See also text accompanying notes 56-65 & 70-75 infra.
43 99 S. Ct. at 2211-12. See note 42 supra.
" 99 S. Ct. at 2212. Brown v. Felsen is in accord with the majority of previous decisions
which have addressed the res judicata issue in connection with fraud. See, e.g., In re Pigge,
539 F.2d 369, 372 (4th Cir. 1976) (unnecessary for state court to consider fraud issue when
state court found debtor owed money); In re Bums, 357 F. Supp: 176, 178 (D. Kan. 1972) (no
res judicata because of 1970 amendments granting exclusive jurisdiction to bankruptcy
1980]
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Brown v. Felsen apparently settled the res judicata question faced by
bankruptcy courts when determining whether a debt is nondischargeable
because of fraud. Specifically, when a prebankruptcy state court proceed-
ing has reduced a debt to judgment 'vithout commenting on whether the
debtor is liable for fraud, the bankruptcy court will not be limited to the
state court record to determine whether the debt is nondischargeable be-
cause of fraud. However, in a footnote to Brown v. Felsen,45 the Supreme
Court conspicuously left the collateral estoppel question unresolved. The
Brown Court stated that "[t]his case concerns res judicata only, and not
the narrower principle of collateral estoppel."" The Court noted, however,
that absent countervailing statutory policy of the Bankruptcy Act, collat-
eral estoppel effect would be given to a prior state court decision if the state
law standards for fraud are identical to the Bankruptcy Act standards."1
Based on the Brown footnote, a bankruptcy court, while barred from
giving a prior state court decision res judicata effect, would not be barred
from giving the prior decision collateral estoppel effect unless there is a
statutory policy of the Bankruptcy Act against collateral estoppel. The
statutory policy of the Bankruptcy Act is twofold. The primary purpose of
the Act is to collect and distribute the bankrupt's estate to his creditors."
The discharge of the bankrupt from his debts is a secondary purpose.49
Discharge is only granted to the honest debtor." Consequently, there
should be no counterveiling statutory policy against collateral estoppel
when the bankrupt previously has been adjudicated a defrauder by a state
court applying standards of fraud identical to the standards of section
17a(2) of the Bankruptcy Act or section 523a(2) of the Reform Act. A
bankruptcy judge seemingly is no more qualified to decide a case involving
courts. See also notes 34 & 36 supra.
The few courts which have held that res judicata should apply have done so based on
the doctrine of res judicata in general and have failed to consider the purpose of the 1970
amendments. See In re Nicholas, 510 F.2d 160, 163 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1012
(1975) (since entire record of state court established liability based on breach of contract and
did not mention fraud, res judicata bars bankruptcy court from looking behind state court
record); In re Matthews, 2 BANKR. CT. DEC. 492, 496 (N.D. Ala. 1976); cf. William McDonald
LTD. v. Miller, 4 BANKR. CT. DEC. 954, 957 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (court noted parties knew
bankruptcy was contemplated when consent judgment in state court was entered); In re
Cervone, 2 BANKR. CT. DEC. 872, 874-75 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (prior state court decision had res
judicata effect on nondischargeability claim for willful and malicious injury under Bank-
ruptcy Act section 17a(8) because creditor could have brought action on this cause in state
court).
11 99 S. Ct. at 2213 n.10.
46 Id.
47 Id.
" See 1A COLLIER 1978, supra note 25, 14.02[1]; Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642,
645-46 (1974) (bankrupt's estate first is distributed to creditors, then bankrupt is given fresh
start with such rights as statute left untouched).
"1 See note 48 supra.
50 Id.; accord, Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 245 (1934) (discharge is to relieve
honest debtor); Countryman, Consumers in Bankruptcy Cases, 18 WAs URN L. Rav. 1, 5
(1978) (discharge should only be accorded honest debtor).
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actual fraud5' than is a state court judge.5 2
In addition, the Supreme Court previously held in Heiser v. Woodruff"
that a bankruptcy court should give collateral estoppel effect to a prebank-
ruptcy decision.54 Although Heiser would probably be decided differently
today since the prebankruptcy decision given collateral estoppel effect was
a default judgment," Heiser suggests that the Supreme Court did not
believe there was a counterveiling statutory policy against the application
of collateral estoppel. Since the Heiser decision, however, Congress passed
the 1970 amendments to the Bankruptcy Act." In Brown v. Felsen,5" the
Supreme Court acknowledged that the amendments have been interpreted
to mean that collateral estoppel effect should not be given to a prior state
court decision." In fact, the 1970 amendments provide the only rationale
against giving collateral estoppel effect to a prior state court decision. The
1970 amendments vested the bankruptcy courts with exclusive jurisdiction
to decide whether a particular debt is nondischargeable under certain sec-
tions of the Bankruptcy Act, including section 17a(2) ." According to those
opposed to giving collateral estoppel effect to prior state court decisions,
the ability of the 1970 amendments to strengthen the discharge in bank-
ruptcy would be greatly reduced, if the bankrupt were barred from reliti-
gating the fraud issue in bankruptcy courts." This objection to allowing
collateral estoppel, however, misinterprets the true congressional intent
behind the 1970 amendments.
The major purpose of the 1970 amendments was to render discharges
in bankruptcy less vulnerable to post-bankruptcy abuses by harassing
creditors." Before the 1970 amendments, creditors were permitted to bring
5, See note 25 supra.
52 A bankruptcy judge seemingly is no more qualified to decide a case involving actual
fraud than a state court judge since actual fraud is one of the oldest civil causes of action.
327 U.S. 726 (1946).
5 Id. at 736.
" The lower federal courts generally agree that collateral estoppel effect should not be
given to any default judgment. See note 14 supra. A debtor should not be compelled to defend
and litigate merely to establish the precise ground of liability. See 1B MooRE's, supra note
6, 0.444[2]. Also, collateral estoppel requires that the issue actually be litigated. See text
accompanying notes 13 & 14 supra. Since in a default judgment the losing party fails to
defend himself in court, the issues are not actually litigated..
" 11 U.S.C. §§ 32f, 35c (1976).
5 99 S. Ct. 2213 n.10.
" See 1A CoLuIER 1978, supra note 25, 17.1616]; Countryman, supra note 42, at 49-
50.
" See note 42 supra & note 93 infra.
" In re McMillan, 579 F.2d 289, 294 (3d Cir. 1978) (Gibbons, J., concurring) (stating 1970
amendments designed to make bankruptcy court sole forum for discharge determination); In
re Houtman, 568 F.2d 651, 653 (9th Cir. 1978) (1970 amendments allow no room for technical
doctrine of collateral estoppel); In re Blessings, 442 F. Supp. 68, 70-71 (S.D. Ind. 1977); In re
Bums, 357 F. Supp. 176, 178 (D. Kan. 1972) (stating since bankruptcy court has exclusive
jurisdiction there can be no collateral estoppel); See 1A CoLLIER 1978, supra note 25,
17.16[6] (discharge in bankruptcy court would be dissipated).
"1 H.R. REP. No. 1502, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 2, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CoDs CONG. &
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suit in state courts in order to determine whether a particular debt was
excepted from the general discharge given the bankrupt debtor.2 Many
creditors went into state court hoping that the bankrupt would fail to
appear in the post-bankruptcy action. 3 As a result of the bankrupt's fail-
ure to appear, the creditor received a default judgment. The bankrupt's
debt was excepted from the general discharge when, in fact, the debt may
not have fallen under one of the specific discharge exceptions.64
If collateral estoppel effect were given by a bankruptcy court to a pre-
bankruptcy decision, the debtor would not be susceptible to harassment
by creditors similar to the post-bankruptcy abuses. In order for the pre-
bankruptcy decision to be given collateral estoppel effect, the issue of fraud
actually must have been litigated. 5 If the bankrupt debtor failed to litigate
the fraud issue in the prebankruptcy decision, by the rules of collateral
estoppel, the prebankruptcy decision is not binding on the bankruptcy
court. Therefore, giving collateral estoppel effect to a prebankruptcy deci-
sion does not dissipate the effect of the 1970 amendments since the debtor
took advantage of the opportunity to show in state court that the debt was
not induced by fraud.
In addition, the Supreme Court addressed itself in another context to
the collateral estoppel effect which should be given by a federal court
vested with exclusive jurisdiction to a prior state court decision. In Becher
v. Contoure Laboratories, Inc.,6 the Court held that the grant of exclusive
jurisdiction to the federal courts does not give the federal courts exclusive
AD. NEws 4156, 4156; see In re Mountjoy, 368 F. Supp. 1087, 1094 (W.D. Mo. 1973) (1970
amendments added to cure abuse of creditors procuring post-bankruptcy default judgments);
Brody, The So-Called Dischargeability Bill-Public Law 91-467. A Milestone in Bankruptcy
Legislation, 76 COM. L.J. 9, 9 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Brody]; Note, 1970 Amendments
to the Bankruptcy Act-An Attempt to Remedy Discharge Abuses, 69 MICH. L. REv. 1347,
1353 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Discharge Abuses].
62 See note 2 supra.
3 The bankrupt often failed to appear in the post-bankruptcy action because he did not
realize the general discharge by the bankruptcy court was an affirmative defense which was
waived if not pleaded. The bankrupt also may have failed to appear because he was unable
to afford an attorney or because he was not properly served. H.R. REP. No. 1502, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. 1, 2, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4156, 4156; see Brody, supra
note 61, at 9; Discharge Abuses, supra note 61, at 1353.
64 H.R. REP. No. 1502, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 2, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 4156, 4156; see Brody, supra note 61, at 9; Discharge Abuses, supra note 61, at
1353.
65 See text accompanying notes 13 & 14 supra.
" 279 U.S. 388 (1929). In Becher, the plaintiff was employed as a machinist to construct
an invention. The employment agreement provided that anything the plaintiff discovered
while working for his employer would be kept confidential and could not be used by the
plaintiff for his personal benefit. Contrary to the agreement, the plaintiff patented the inven-
tion himself. The employer then sued the plaintiff in state court for breach of contract and
fiduciary duty. After the employer won in state court, the plaintiff brought suit in federal
court against the employer for patent infringement. Id. at 388-89. Finding the issues of fact
and law in the two suits to be similar, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's ruling
that the state court's findings had collateral estoppel effect on the federal court. Id. at 392.
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power to determine facts which might be conclusive upon a federal claim.67
Even though the state court decision may be dispositive of a federal claim,
the state court merely establishes a fact. The federal court must then
accept that finding of fact and give specific effect to the fact in connection
with the federal claim.
68
In a bankruptcy situation, prior state court decisions establish fraud,
which is a finding of fact.", Therefore, if the state law standards of fraud
are identical to the bankruptcy standards, the bankruptcy court should
accept the state court's finding of fact and give specific effect to that
finding when the dischargeability of the bankrupt's debt is decided.
Another reason that the 1970 amendments have been interpreted to
foreclose the doctrine of collateral estoppel is section 14fP of the Bank-
ruptcy Act.71 Section 14f provides that an order of general discharge shall
declare any prior judgment in any other court null and void with respect
to the liability of the debtor.2 Since the bankruptcy courts have the power
" Id. at 391.
86 Id. at 391-92. But see Lyons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 222 F.2d 184 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 825 (1955). Westinghouse sued Lyons in state court for breach of contract,
and Lyons interposed restraint of trade as a defense. Westinghouse won the state suit, and
the state court held that Lyons defense had not been established. Lyons appealed the state
court decision and sued Westinghouse in-federal court, alleging violations of federal antitrust
laws, while the state court appeal was pending. The district court stayed the federal proceed-
ings pending resolution of the state appeal, and Lyons appealed the stay. Id. at 185.
The circuit court ordered the district court to vacate the stay. Id. at 190. Judge Learned
Hand, writing for the majority, noted that the state court finding against Lyons' antitrust
defense would not have collateral estoppel effect on the district court. Hand tried to differen-
tiate Becher v. Contoure Laboratories,Inc., 279 U.S. 388 (1929), by distinguishing "between
the finding of one of the constituent facts that together make up a claim and the entire
congeries of such facts taken as a unit." 222 F.2d at 188. The former creates an estoppel while
the latter does not. Id. The distinction between "constitutent" facts and "congeries" of such
facts have generally been equated with the difference between findings of fact and application
of law to fact. See Note, The Collateral Estoppel Effect of Prior State Court Findings in Cases
Within Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction, 91 HARv. L. Rav. 1281, 1284 (1978) (specifically ex-
cluding bankruptcy because of unique nature of bankruptcy proceedings and remedies).
However, in other areas, of exclusive federal jurisdiction, federal courts arguably should give
collateral estoppel effect to state court decisions which involve common law questions using
standards identical to the federal standards. Id. at 1286-87.
The situation in a bankruptcy proceeding, however, is moreanalogous to the Becher case
than the Lyons case. Unlike Lyons where the state court ruled on an issue based solely on
federal law, the state courts in Becher and in the bankruptcy situation ruled on an issue based
on state common law. Id. at 1285.
11 Trice v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 334 F.2d 673, 677 (6th Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 380 U.S. 915 (1965) (trial judge erred in granting judgment n.o.v. because fraud is
issue'of fact for jury).
70 11 U.S.C. § 32f (1976). An order of general discharge shall declare any judgment in
any other court null and void with respect to the bankrupt's debts which were not excepted
from discharge under § 17a or debts specifically discharged under § 17c, 11 U.S.C. § 35a & c
(1976).
11 See 1A CoLLE 1978, supra note 25, 17.16[6]; Countryman, supra note 42, at 49-
50.
" See note 70 supra.
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to declare a prior state court judgment against the bankrupt null and void,
section 14f has been interpreted as requiring the bankruptcy court to make
an independent determination of fraud. 3 Requiring such independent de-
termination, however, is premature. Section 14f only allows the bank-
ruptcy court to make a null and void declaration once a determination has
been made that a debt is not excepted by section 17 of the Bankruptcy
Act.74 The bankruptcy court cannot make a determination of an exception
to discharge until the court considers the effect of the prior court's finding
of fraud.75
Nevertheless, most courts have noted that collateral estoppel effect
should be given to a prior state court decision if the required elements for
bankruptcy fraud had been litigated and fraud was clearly found by the
state court.78 The few cases which actually decided the collateral estoppel
issue before Brown v. Felsen differed in results.7 7 Since the Brown v. Felsen
13 See 1A COLLIER 1978, supra note 25, 17.16[6]; Countryman, supra note 42, at 49-
50.
"' See note 70 supra.
75 Brody, The New Dischargeability Bill, in INsTrrtrE OF CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION,
BAsic BANKRUPTCY 50 (L. Abramson ed. 1971).
"' See In re McMillan, 579 F.2d 289, 292-93 (3d Cir. 1978); In re Pigge, 539 F.2d 369, 373
(4th Cir. 1976); In re Conway, 3 BANKR. CT. DEC. 365, 366 (N.D. Tex. 1977); In re Garrard, 3
BANKR. CT. DEC. 223, 224 (N.D. Ga. 1977); In re Matthews, 2 BAKR. CT. DEC. 492, 496 (N.D.
Ala. 1976). Unfortunately, these cases are void of analysis as to why collateral estoppel effect
should be given. Cf. Coen v. Zick, 458 F.2d 326, 330 (9th Cir. 1972); National Homes Corp.
v. Lester, Indus., 336 F. Supp. 644, 648 (W.D. Va. 1972) (collateral estoppel effect given to
prior decisions based on exception of willful and malicious injuries under 17a(2) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, presently codified at 11 U.S.C. § 35a(8) (1976)).
11 See In In re Herman, [1979] 2 BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 67,087 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), the
Southern District of New York held that a prior state court decision operated as collateral
estoppel. Without discussion or analysis, the court ruled that since the state standards and
the bankruptcy standards were virtually identical and since the state jury possibly could have
found fraud, collateral estoppel effect must be given to the prior decision and the debt was
nondischargeable. Id.; accord, In re Walshak, 3 BANKR. CT. DEC. 118, 119 (W.D. Pa. 1977)
(no reason to relitigate issue when state court made specific findings of fraud based on
bankruptcy standards).
The Ninth Circuit, however, has held that a bankruptcy court should not give collateral
estoppel effect to a prior state court decision. In re Houtman, 568 F.2d 651, 653 (9th Cir. 1978).
The Houtman court reasoned that the 1970 amendments to the Bankruptcy Act allowed no
room for the application of collateral estoppel. Id. The court stated that the expertise of the
bankruptcy court would be impaired if the bankruptcy court gave collateral estoppel effect
to a prior state court's factual findings. Id. at 654 n.2. The expertise rationale, however,
neglects the fact that consideration of actual fraud is not unique to bankruptcy courts.
Even though the Houtman court refused to give collateral estoppel effect to the state
court decision, the court held that the state court judgment based on fraud was sufficient to
establish a prima facie case that the debt was nondischargeable under § 17a(2). Id. at 654.
Since the bankrupt debtor was unable to rebut the state court record, the Houtman court
held that the debt was nondischargeable. Id. at 655-56. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit
seems to say that even though technically there may not be collateral estoppel, in effect there
is collateral estoppel. If the issue of fraud is fully litigated in the prior state court proceedings
and if the state court specifically determines the existence of fraud based on the bankruptcy
standard for fraud, the bankrupt debtor will have difficulty rebutting the evidence. In addi-
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decision, only the Third Circuit has faced the collateral estoppel issue. In
In re Ross,75 Ross was indebted to Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer (MGM) because
of a violation by Ross of Rule 10b-5 of the Federal Securities Regula-
tions."0 After Ross filed for bankruptcy, MGM claimed that the debt was
not dischargeable under section 17a(2) of the Bankruptcy Act and that
collateral estoppel effect should be given to the Second Circuit's decision
(MGM) which held Ross had violated Rule 10b-5.81 The bankruptcy court
refused to give collateral estoppel effect to the MGM decision. The district
court reversed the bankruptcy court, 2 and concluded that the fraud stan-
dard for a Rule 10b-5 violation in the circuit where the MGM decision was
decided was the same as under section 17a(2) of the Bankruptcy Act.1 The
Third Circuit reversed the district court and remanded the case to the
bankruptcy court to review the MGM record and determine, in light of
Brown v. Felsen, whether the MGM record supports the application of
tion, the debtor could also benefit from the doctrine of collateral estoppel. If the prior state
court record clearly shows that an element of fraud is missing and the creditor was able to
appeal the prior decision, the debt must be discharged. See In re Burns, 357 F. Supp. 176,
178 (D. Kan. 1972) (since state court record revealed no intent to deceive and no reliance by
creditor, debt is discharged); In re Newman, [1975-76 Transfer Binder] BANKR. L. REP.
(CCH) 65,906 (E.D. Tenn. 1976) (since state court found no fraud, debt is discharged).
78 602 F.2d 604 (3d Cir. 1979). See also In re Tessman, 5 BsANR. CT. DEC. 435 (W.D. Mich.
1979). Relying on Brown v. Felsen, the Western District of Michigan held that there should
be no collateral estoppel effect given to a prior state court decision when the bankruptcy court
determines whether a debt is excepted from discharge by § 17a(8) of the Bankruptcy Act
which excepts willful and malicious injuries. Id. at 438. However, whether the Tessman
court's reliance on Brown was proper is doubtful. The Tessman court's conclusion relied solely
on the language in Brown where the Supreme Court said that "res judicata" would be
inconsistent with the philosophy of the 1970 amendments to the Bankruptcy Act. No mention
was made of footnote 10 of the Brown decision, where the Supreme Court addressed collateral
estoppel.
71 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1979). Rule 10b-5 makes it unlawful for any person to defraud,
to make any untrue statement of material fact, or to omit material facts in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security.
" See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Ross, 509 F.2d 930, 932-33 (2d Cir. 1975), rev'g 363
F. Supp. 23 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). In MGM, Ross had misrepresented material facts to MGM when
MGM entered into a contract with Ross to buy a company. The Second Circuit held that
Ross had violated Rule 10b-5 and awarded MGM $303,000. In ruling on Ross' Rule 10b-5
violation, the circuit court did not make a specific finding of fraud by Ross. Id. at 933.
However, there must be actual fraud involved in order to have a private cause of action for
damages under Rule 10b-5. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193, 215 (1976).
See also note 86 infra.
"1 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Ross, 509 F.2d 903, 932-33 (2d Cir. 1975); note 80
supra.
852 In re Ross, 602 F.2d 604, 607 (3d Cir. 1979).
3Id. The district court judge in Ross relied on Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277,
1305 (2d Cir. 1973), when he concluded the bankruptcy standards and Rule 10b-5 standards
for fraud were identical. In re Ross, 602 F.2d 604, 605 n.2 (3d Cir. 1979). In Lanza, the Second
Circuit held that in order for there to be a Rule 10b-5 violation, the defendant either must
have actually known his representations were false or had a reckless disregard for the truth.
Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 279 F.2d at 1306. See text accompanying notes 88-90 infra.
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collateral estoppel."
On its face, In re Ross seems to contradict itself. The case appears to
say collateral estoppel effect should be given to prior judgments if the
standards of fraud are the same."8 However, since Rule 10b-5 of the Securi-
ties Regulations and section 17a(2) of the Bankruptcy Act both require
fraud,"8 the Third Circuit's decision to remand indicates that collateral
estoppel effect should not be given. One possible explanation for the appar-
ent contradiction in the Ross decision may be the lack of a specific finding
of fraud in the MGM decision. This explanation fails, however, because the
Second Circuit's finding that Ross had violated the Securities Regulations
required an implicit finding of fraud. The only possible explanation for this
apparent contradiction can be seen from closely examining the positions
of the judges involved in the MGM decision and the Lanza v. Drexel &
Co.87 decision relied on by the district court in Ross.
In Lanza, Judges Hays and Smith dissented stating that under certain
circumstances, negligent conduct establishes liability for a Rule 10b-5 vio-
lation."8 These two judges were two of the three judges who held that Ross
had violated Rule 10b-5 in the MGM decision. Since the MGM decision
made no specific finding of actual knowledge or recklessness by Ross, the
MGM court possibly found a Rule 10b-5 violation because Ross only negli-
gently disregarded the truth.89 If negligence was the standard used in the
MGM decision, then the MGM decision should not be given collateral
estoppel effect since the knowledge standard was not the same knowledge
standard required for fraud under section 17a(2).8° Consequently, although
the Third Circuit in In re Ross apparently held that collateral estoppel
effect should be given, the case was remanded to the bankruptcy court to
examine the MGM records to see if the required knowledge standard was
used. If the required knowledge standard was not used or if the bankruptcy
court is unable to determine what standard was used, the Third Circuit
u In re Ross, 602 F.2d 604, 605-06 (3d Cir. 1979).
15 Id. at 607-08. The Ross court stated that Brown v. Felsen indicates that collateral
estoppel should be allowed and sets out requirements for collateral estoppel. Id.
" In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), the Supreme Court held that
absent an allegation of "scienter," no private cause of action for damages will lie under Rule
10b-5. Id. at 193. Courts have interpreted this "scienter" requirement to mean that the
defendant either knowingly made false representations or had a reckless disregard for the
truth. See Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332, 1336-38 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970
(1978). See also note 80 supra.
479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973). See note 83 supra.
Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1317 (2d Cir. 1973) (Hays, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). See note 83 supra.
U The Supreme Court has held that a defendant is not liable for a Rule lob-5 violation
if the defendant only had a negligent disregard for the truth. Ernst & Ernst v. Hockfelder,
425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976). However, Ernst & Ernst was decided after the Lanza and MGM
decisions. Therefore, Judges Hays and Smith in the MGM decision may have still applied
the negligence standard for a Rule lob-5 violation since at the time only their fellow judges
in the Second Circuit and not the Supreme Court disagreed with them.
1* See note 25 supra.
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apparently stated that the fraud issue must be relitigated.
There are several reasons why a bankruptcy court should give collateral
estoppel effect to a prior state court decision, provided that the standards
for fraud used by the state court are identical to the standards of the
Bankruptcy Act9' and that the requirements for collateral estoppel are
satisfied." The objection that the exclusive jurisdiction93 of the bankruptcy
court to determine whether certain debts are excepted from discharge pre-
cludes giving collateral estoppel effect is unfounded. The bankruptcy court
was vested with exclusive jurisdiction to prevent post-bankruptcy harass-
ment by creditors. In a collateral estoppel situation there is no such harass-
ment since the bankrupt actually must have litigated the fraud issue be-
fore collateral estoppel is allowed. 4 Fraud is an issue of fact, and the
federal courts do not have exclusive jurisdiction over questions of fact
which might be conclusive upon a federal cause of action. 5 The state courts
are as competent as bankruptcy courts to determine if actual fraud existed.
Since the statutory policy for discharge is to protect the honest debtor, 9 a




2 See text accompanying notes 11-18 supra.
" Under the Reform Act the bankruptcy court will enjoy expanded jurisdiction. 28
U.S.C.A. § 1471 (Supp. 1979); Klien, The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 53 A. BAMN.
L.J. 1, 5 (1979). The bankruptcy court will be given exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under
the Reform Act but only will have original jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under
the Reform Act. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1471(a), (b) & (c) (Supp. 1979). Since the determination of
whether a particular debtjs excepted from the general discharge is considered a civil proceed-
ing arising under the Reform Act, the bankruptcy court only will have original jurisdiction
to determine exceptions to the general discharge. See BANKRuprCY 1979, supra note 25,
523.06[13]; H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 49, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE &
CONG. AD. NEws 5963, 6010; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 153, reprinted in [19781
U.S. CODE & CONG. AD. NEws, 5787, 5939. The one exception to the grant of original jurisdic-
tion only to determine exceptions to the general discharge is in 11 U.S.C.A. § ,523c, which
grants exclusive jurisdiction for determination of dischargeability under 11 U.S.C.A. §
523a(2), (4) & (6) (1979). BANKRUTcy 1979, supra note 25, 523.06[13]. Since under the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 the bankruptcy court had exclusive jurisdiction in determining dis-
chargeability only for the equivalent provisions to 11 U.S.C.A. § 523a(2), (4) & (6) (1979),
the Reform Act does not change or increase the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction with respect
to dischargeability. See note 42 supra; BANUWpTcY 1979, supra note 25, 523.07, 523.13,
523.16. Therefore, nothing discussed in the article would be different because of the expanded
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court under the Reform Act.
" See text accompanying notes 61-65 supra.
, See text accompanying notes 66-69 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 48-52 supra.
'T As shown by the Third Circuit in In re Ross, a bankruptcy court may not give collateral
estoppel effect because of a technicality. Therefore, a creditor who sues a debtor for fraud
should have the presiding judge make specific findings in his opinion or in his order which
conform with the bankruptcy standard of fraud. Given these findings, the creditor should not
lose in a discharge proceeding if the debtor subsequently files for bankruptcy.
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